Journal of Innovative and Creativity
Journal Homepage: https://joecy.org/index.php/joecy
e-mail: journaljoecy@gmail.com

Faculty of Education
University of Pahlawan Tuanku Tambusai
ISSN 2775-771X (Online)
ISSN 2962-570X **(Printed)**
6 (1) 2026, Page 4466 -4475

Presidential Powers in Determining and Implementing an Economic Emergency: An Indonesian Constitutional Law Perspective

Intansevina[1], Halomoan Freddy Sitinjak Alexandra[2], Pujo Widodo[3]
[1,2,3]Emergency Law Study Program,Faculty of National Security, Republic of Indonesia Defense University
e-mail: intansevina@kn.idu.ac.id

ABSTRAK

Keberlanjutan pembangunan ekonomi nasional menghadapi berbagai ancaman non-militer seperti krisis ekonomi global, gejolak sistem keuangan, dan pandemi, yang menuntut respons cepat dan luar biasa dari Presiden sebagai pemegang kekuasaan eksekutif berdasarkan Konstitusi Republik Indonesia tahun 1945. Dalam konteks ini, kewenangan presiden untuk menentukan dan menerapkan kebijakan dalam situasi darurat menjadi sangat penting secara strategis, meskipun regulasi eksplisit tentang "darurat ekonomi" tidak ditemukan secara jelas dalam kerangka hukum yang berlaku saat ini. Studi ini bertujuan untuk menganalisis regulasi dan praktik kewenangan presiden dalam menentukan dan menerapkan darurat ekonomi berdasarkan hukum konstitusi Indonesia, dan untuk merumuskan konstruksi ideal dari kewenangan tersebut yang tetap konsisten dengan supremasi hukum dan perlindungan hak-hak konstitusional warga negara. Penelitian ini menggunakan metode yuridis normatif dengan pendekatan hukum perundang-undangan, konseptual, dan kasus, berdasarkan Konstitusi 1945, Peraturan Pemerintah Pengganti Undang-Undang Nomor 23 Tahun 1959 tentang Keadaan Darurat, peraturan tentang keuangan negara pada masa krisis, dan literatur tentang hukum konstitusional darurat. Temuan menunjukkan adanya kesenjangan normatif mengenai parameter dan batasan kekuasaan presiden dalam keadaan darurat ekonomi, yang membuka ruang bagi perluasan kekuasaan yang berpotensi merusak konstitusionalisme. Studi ini mengusulkan model untuk konstruksi kekuasaan presiden dalam keadaan darurat ekonomi yang menentukan indikator, prosedur, batasan temporal dan material, serta mekanisme pengawasan oleh lembaga negara lainnya, untuk memastikan bahwa kekuasaan darurat dijalankan dalam kerangka supremasi hukum.

Kata kunci: Kekuasaan presiden, Keadaan darurat ekonomi, Hukum konstitusional, Supremasi hukum.

ABSTRACT

The sustainability of national economic development faces various non-military threats such as global economic crises, financial system turbulence, and pandemics, which demand swift and extraordinary responses from the President as the holder of executive power under the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia. In this context, presidential powers to determine and implement policies in emergency situations become strategically important, although explicit regulation of an "economic emergency" is not clearly found in the current statutory framework. This study aims to analyse the regulation and practice of presidential powers in determining and implementing an economic emergency under Indonesian constitutional law, and to formulate an ideal construction of such powers that remains consistent with the rule of law and the protection of citizens' constitutional rights. This research employs a normative juridical method with statutory, conceptual, and case approaches, based on the 1945 Constitution, Government Regulation in Lieu of Law Number 23 of 1959 on State of Emergency, regulations on state finance in times of crisis, and literature on emergency constitutional law. The findings reveal a normative gap concerning parameters and limits of presidential powers in an economic emergency, which opens room for power expansion potentially undermining constitutionalism. This study proposes a model for the construction of presidential powers in an economic emergency that specifies indicators, procedures, temporal and material limits, and oversight mechanisms by other state institutions, ensuring that emergency powers are exercised within the framework of the rule of law.

Keywords: Presidential powers, Economic emergency, Constitutional law, Rule of law.

© The Author(s). 2026 Open Access This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License, which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons licence, and indicate if changes were made. The images or other third party material in this article are included in the article's Creative Commons licence, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. To view a copy of this licence, visit http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0

INTRODUCTION

The sustainability of Indonesia's national economic development unfolds within an increasingly complex and uncertain global environment. Economic globalization, the integration of financial markets, and heightened vulnerability to global crises have made the national economy highly sensitive to both external and internal shocks (Asshiddiqie, 2007). Economic crises, financial system instability, and pandemics are no longer merely technical issues within the economic sector; they are widely recognized as concrete threats to national security of a non-military nature because they can disrupt political stability, social order, and the performance of basic state functions (Asshiddiqie, 2007). In this context, the need for swift, extraordinary, and sometimes non-routine policy responses becomes crucial when the government, particularly the President, seeks to prevent or mitigate the collapse of economic and social structures (Agamben, 2005).

Constitutionally, the President holds executive power under the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia and is simultaneously vested with specific powers in exceptional situations (Asshiddiqie, 2007). The 1945 Constitution provides a basis for the President to declare a state of danger and to issue government regulations in lieu of law in circumstances of compelling urgency. These powers represent a form of emergency authority designed to address extraordinary conditions in which ordinary legislative procedures are inadequate to respond to the urgency of threats faced by the state (Asshiddiqie, 2007; Dyzenhaus, 2006). However, the constitutional framework does not explicitly differentiate between various types of emergencies, including what might be classified as an "economic emergency", even though the impact of economic crises on state continuity can be as serious as that of military threats (Dyzenhaus, 2006).

Further regulation regarding the state of danger is set out in Government Regulation in Lieu of Law Number 23 of 1959 on State of Emergency, which establishes types of emergencies, procedures for declaration, and the distribution of powers among state organs (Peraturan Pemerintah Pengganti Undang-Undang Republik Indonesia Nomor 23 Tahun 1959, 1959). This regulation was drafted in the early post-independence period, when the primary focus was political and security threats to public order (Asshiddiqie, 2007). The contemporary configuration of threats has shifted significantly: global economic crises, financial system failures, and geoeconomic pressures have become key factors that may undermine state legitimacy and citizens' welfare (Agamben, 2005). At the same time, the existing positive legal framework has not yet systematically recognised "economic emergency" as a distinct category, complete with parameters, procedures for declaration, and clear limits on presidential powers in confronting such a situation (Dyzenhaus, 2006).

A number of previous studies have examined presidential powers in emergencies from the perspective of Indonesian constitutional law. Some works analyse the President's authority to declare a state of emergency in general, the relationship between constitutional provisions on the state of danger

and government regulations in lieu of law, and the practice of using such regulations under conditions of compelling urgency (Asshiddiqie, 2007). Other contributions map the implementation of emergency constitutional law in the context of security and political disturbances, while additional research discusses the executive's authority to issue extraordinary fiscal and budgetary measures in times of crisis (Dyzenhaus, 2006; Ferejohn & Pasquino, 2004). These studies collectively highlight the breadth of presidential discretion in emergency contexts and the potential tension between effectiveness and constitutional safeguards (Dyzenhaus, 2006; Ferejohn & Pasquino, 2004).

However, studies that specifically juxtapose presidential powers with the category of an economic emergency as an autonomous construct within Indonesian constitutional law remain relatively limited (Asshiddiqie, 2007). Much of the literature treats economic crises as part of the general emergency context or addresses them from the standpoint of economic and financial policy rather than from the viewpoint of the normative construction of emergency powers within the constitutional framework (Agamben, 2005; Dyzenhaus, 2006). At the theoretical level, discussions of emergency powers often draw on comparative experiences and general theories of constitutional emergencies, yet they have not been fully translated into a concrete model of presidential powers explicitly tailored to economic crisis situations in Indonesia (Agamben, 2005; Dyzenhaus, 2006; Ferejohn & Pasquino, 2004). This creates a gap between the practical need to resort to emergency-type powers in the economic sphere and the clarity of their legal and constitutional foundations (Dyzenhaus, 2006).

This gap becomes increasingly significant when viewed through the lens of the rule of law and constitutionalism. On the one hand, the state is required to act swiftly and effectively to prevent economic collapse and its widespread social consequences. On the other hand, the exercise of emergency powers without clear parameters and procedures risks facilitating an expansion of executive authority that is difficult to control and may erode the separation of powers and the protection of constitutional rights (Dyzenhaus, 2006). In the absence of a clear normative construction of an economic emergency—including indicators, procedures for declaration, temporal and material limits on presidential powers, and oversight mechanisms—practice is likely to evolve on the basis of short-term political considerations and unilateral executive interpretations rather than on firmly established legal standards (Agamben, 2005; Dyzenhaus, 2006).

Against this background, this study focuses on the analysis of presidential powers in determining and implementing an economic emergency from the perspective of Indonesian constitutional law. The central problems examined are, first, how the regulation and practice of presidential powers in determining and implementing an economic emergency are configured under Indonesian constitutional law; and second, how an ideal model of presidential powers in an economic emergency should be constructed in order to uphold the rule of law and the protection of citizens' constitutional rights (Asshiddiqie, 2007; Dyzenhaus, 2006). These research questions reflect a two-layered analysis: a

descriptive-analytical mapping of the existing normative framework and practice, and a normative-prescriptive inquiry in the form of a proposed ideal construction of presidential emergency powers (Dyzenhaus, 2006).

This study therefore aims, first, to describe and systematically analyse the regulation and practice of presidential powers in determining and implementing an economic emergency on the basis of the 1945 Constitution, Government Regulation in Lieu of Law Number 23 of 1959, and relevant regulations on state finance in times of crisis, as well as pertinent judicial decisions (Asshiddiqie, 2007). Second, it seeks to formulate an ideal model of presidential powers in an economic emergency grounded in the principles of the rule of law, constitutionalism, and the protection of citizens' constitutional rights, while also taking into account theories of emergency powers and Indonesia's own constitutional practice (Agamben, 2005; Dyzenhaus, 2006; Ferejohn & Pasquino, 2004). In doing so, the study is expected to contribute theoretically to the development of the doctrine of emergency constitutional law—especially regarding the category of economic emergency—and, at the same time, to offer a clearer normative framework for policymakers in designing a proportional and accountable regulation of presidential powers that remains firmly within the bounds of law (Dyzenhaus, 2006).

RESEARCH METHODS

This study employs a normative juridical (doctrinal) research method that focuses on legal norms governing presidential powers in emergency situations and their systematic interpretation within the framework of Indonesian constitutional law (Asshiddiqie, 2007). The normative juridical approach is used because the core issues examined in this article concern the construction, scope, and limits of presidential authority as regulated in the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia, Government Regulation in Lieu of Law on the State of Emergency, and other related legislation, rather than empirical behaviour or public perceptions. Accordingly, the primary emphasis of the research lies in analysing legal texts and doctrines.

This research employs a normative juridical (doctrinal) method, which views law primarily as a set of norms contained in legislation, judicial decisions, and legal doctrines rather than as empirical social behaviour (Asshiddiqie, 2007; Dyzenhaus, 2006). The choice of a normative juridical approach is grounded in the objective of the study, namely to analyse the regulation and practice of presidential powers in determining and implementing an economic emergency and to formulate an ideal normative construction of such powers within the framework of Indonesian constitutional law. In this sense, the study focuses on the consistency, coherence, and sufficiency of existing legal norms in governing presidential emergency powers in the economic sphere (Dyzenhaus, 2006).

The analysis is conducted through several complementary approaches. First, a statute approach is used to examine constitutional and statutory provisions relevant to presidential emergency powers,

particularly the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia and Government Regulation in Lieu of Law Number 23 of 1959 on State of Emergency (Asshiddiqie, 2007). The statute approach also extends to other regulations on state finance and crisis-related measures that provide the legal basis for extraordinary executive actions in economic emergencies. Second, a conceptual approach is employed to clarify key concepts such as "emergency powers", "state of emergency", and "economic emergency" by drawing on legal doctrines and theoretical works on emergency constitutionalism (Agamben, 2005; Dyzenhaus, 2006; Ferejohn & Pasquino, 2004). Third, where relevant, a case approach is utilised to illustrate how presidential powers have been exercised in concrete situations of crisis, including the use of government regulations in lieu of law and other extraordinary measures in response to economic shocks or systemic disruptions (Asshiddiqie, 2007).

The sources of legal materials in this study consist of primary, secondary, and tertiary legal materials. Primary legal materials include the 1945 Constitution, Government Regulation in Lieu of Law Number 23 of 1959 on State of Emergency, and other statutes and regulations concerning state finances and crisis management that are directly related to the exercise of presidential powers in economic emergencies (Peraturan Pemerintah Pengganti Undang-Undang Republik Indonesia Nomor 23 Tahun 1959, 1959). These materials also potentially encompass constitutional court decisions and other judicial rulings that interpret emergency provisions or presidential powers in times of crisis (Asshiddiqie, 2007). Secondary legal materials comprise scholarly books, journal articles, and research reports that discuss emergency constitutional law, presidential powers, and the rule of law in emergency situations, such as the works of Jimly Asshiddiqie on Indonesian emergency constitutional law and the theoretical contributions of Agamben, Dyzenhaus, and Ferejohn & Pasquino on emergency powers (Agamben, 2005; Asshiddiqie, 2007; Dyzenhaus, 2006; Ferejohn & Pasquino, 2004). Tertiary legal materials include legal dictionaries, encyclopaedias, and other reference works that assist in clarifying terminology and contextualising the primary and secondary sources (Dyzenhaus, 2006).

Data collection is carried out through a systematic literature study of all relevant primary, secondary, and tertiary legal materials. The process involves identifying, classifying, and reviewing constitutional provisions, statutes, regulations, judicial decisions, and doctrinal writings related to presidential emergency powers and economic emergencies (Asshiddiqie, 2007). Particular attention is paid to the internal coherence of norms, their historical development, and their practical application in situations that may be characterised as economic crises or emergencies. The literature on emergency constitutionalism and comparative perspectives is used to provide theoretical depth and to frame the Indonesian context within broader debates on the limits of executive power in times of crisis (Agamben, 2005; Dyzenhaus, 2006; Ferejohn & Pasquino, 2004).

The collected legal materials are analysed using qualitative normative analysis with a combination of deductive and inductive reasoning (Dyzenhaus, 2006). Deductive reasoning is employed by starting

from general principles and norms found in the Constitution and statutes—such as the principles of the rule of law, separation of powers, and protection of constitutional rights—and then examining how these principles ought to regulate presidential powers in economic emergencies (Asshiddiqie, 2007). Inductive reasoning is used by observing concrete legal norms and practices, including instances where presidential powers have been exercised in crisis situations, and then drawing more general conclusions about the strengths, weaknesses, and gaps in the current legal framework (Agamben, 2005; Ferejohn & Pasquino, 2004). Through this combined analytical technique, the study seeks not only to describe the existing regulation and practice of presidential powers, but also to construct an ideal normative model that defines parameters, procedures, and limits for presidential action in economic emergencies in line with constitutional principles and the rule of law (Dyzenhaus, 2006).

RESEARCH RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Research Results

The constitutional framework of Indonesia vests the President with significant authority in emergency situations, primarily through Article 12, which empowers the President to declare a state of danger, and Article 22, which authorises the issuance of government regulations in lieu of law in circumstances of compelling urgency (Asshiddiqie, 2007). These provisions establish the formal foundation for presidential emergency powers but remain general in nature and do not distinguish between different types of emergencies, including those driven predominantly by economic factors (Asshiddiqie, 2007). As a result, the scope of presidential authority in economic crises is inferred from general emergency clauses rather than from a specific constitutional or statutory recognition of "economic emergency".

Government Regulation in Lieu of Law Number 23 of 1959 on State of Emergency concretises Article 12 by defining several levels of emergency—civil emergency, military emergency, and state of war—and by specifying the conditions and territorial scope under which these may be declared (Peraturan Pemerintah Pengganti Undang-Undang Republik Indonesia Nomor 23 Tahun 1959, 1959). The regulation identifies threats such as rebellion, serious public disorder, civil war, natural disasters, and war or threat of war as justifying the declaration of an emergency, with a clear emphasis on security and public order rather than economic disruption as such (Peraturan Pemerintah Pengganti Undang-Undang Republik Indonesia Nomor 23 Tahun 1959, 1959). Economic crises are not explicitly mentioned as a separate ground, even though their effects may reach a level that endangers the life of the state.

In practice, presidential powers have been exercised in ways that approach an economic emergency, particularly in periods of severe economic disruption and systemic financial instability. During major crises, the executive has adopted extraordinary fiscal and financial measures, including budget reallocations, emergency funding schemes, and regulatory interventions in the financial sector, often

justified by reference to crisis or emergency conditions (Asshiddiqie, 2007). Recent responses to crises that combine public health and economic dimensions, such as the Covid-19 pandemic, involved the use of broad regulatory discretion and exceptional financial arrangements framed as necessary to maintain economic stability and state functions (Respublica, 2021). However, these practices have not been accompanied by a formal declaration of an "economic emergency" under a distinct legal regime.

Studies of Indonesian emergency constitutional law generally confirm that presidential powers in emergencies cover three main phases: the decision to declare an emergency, the implementation of emergency measures, and the restriction of certain rights when deemed necessary to restore order and protect the state (Qistina, 2024). The decision to declare a state of danger is typically seen as a presidential prerogative that triggers a range of consequential powers distributed through emergency legislation, including PERPPU 23/1959 (Qistina, 2024). In the financial and economic domain, special regulations and statutory instruments have been used to empower the executive to act rapidly in crisis situations, but the legal linkage between these instruments and a concept of economic emergency remains indirect and under-specified (Justitia, 2020).

Overall, the research results point to a pattern of broad presidential discretion under a general emergency framework, combined with notable gaps in the explicit regulation of economic emergencies. While the Constitution and PERPPU 23/1959 provide a basic architecture for emergency powers, they do not specify criteria for defining an economic emergency or delineate the precise extent of presidential authority in such circumstances (Asshiddiqie, 2007; Peraturan Pemerintah Pengganti Undang-Undang Republik Indonesia Nomor 23 Tahun 1959, 1959). This situation has led to a reliance on ad hoc legislative and regulatory responses to economic crises, rather than on a stable and detailed legal regime governing presidential powers in the economic emergency context.

Discussion

The absence of an explicit legal category of "economic emergency" in the Indonesian constitutional and statutory framework raises important questions from the perspective of emergency constitutionalism and the rule of law. Dyzenhaus (2006) argues that emergency governance should not create legal "black holes" in which executive actions are unconstrained, but should instead operate within "grey holes" where law continues to impose substantive and procedural limits on power. In the Indonesian case, the functional use of emergency-type powers in economic crises, without a clear legal construct of economic emergency, risks creating precisely the kind of grey or even black holes that Dyzenhaus warns against if parameters and oversight mechanisms are not sufficiently defined (Dyzenhaus, 2006).

Agamben (2005) similarly cautions that the state of exception can become a permanent technique of governance if emergency powers are not carefully circumscribed and normalised within the legal order. The broad and flexible invocation of crisis to justify extraordinary economic measures in Indonesia, without a clearly delimited emergency framework, may contribute to the creeping normalisation of

exception in economic policymaking (Agamben, 2005). From this viewpoint, the current configuration—where economic crises are managed through general emergency clauses and flexible financial regulations—risks eroding constitutional safeguards by allowing the executive to expand its authority under the banner of necessity without clear ex ante limits.

Ferejohn and Pasquino (2004) provide a typology of emergency powers that highlights the importance of institutional design, temporal limits, and oversight in maintaining a balance between effective crisis management and constitutional control. When this typology is applied to Indonesia, the existing framework appears to favour strong executive initiative with relatively weak built-in temporal and material limits specific to economic emergencies. While PERPPU 23/1959 provides certain structural limits, such as the requirement of legislative involvement and differentiation between levels of emergency, it does not address economic crises as a distinct context, nor does it regulate specific tools and boundaries of presidential action in that domain (Peraturan Pemerintah Pengganti Undang-Undang Republik Indonesia Nomor 23 Tahun 1959, 1959; Ferejohn & Pasquino, 2004).

In light of these theoretical concerns and empirical patterns, an ideal construction of presidential powers in an economic emergency for Indonesia should incorporate several key elements. First, economic emergency needs to be defined in legal terms through objective indicators of severe economic disruption—for example, systemic financial instability, drastic contractions in key sectors, or acute fiscal crises that materially threaten the capacity of the state to fulfil its constitutional functions (International IDEA, 2018). Second, the procedure for declaring an economic emergency should involve not only the President but also the legislature, possibly supplemented by advice from independent financial or economic authorities, thereby ensuring that the decision is grounded in both expert assessment and democratic legitimacy (Ferejohn & Pasquino, 2004).

Third, temporal and material limits on presidential powers in economic emergencies must be clearly specified. Time limits for emergency declarations, renewals subject to legislative approval, and sunset clauses for extraordinary measures would help prevent emergency powers from becoming indefinite or normalised (International IDEA, 2018). Materially, the scope of permissible measures—such as budget reallocations, emergency borrowing, interventions in financial markets, or temporary adjustments to regulatory requirements—should be enumerated and linked to principles of necessity and proportionality, with explicit prohibitions on measures that would unduly infringe core constitutional rights (Dyzenhaus, 2006). Fourth, robust oversight mechanisms should be institutionalised, including judicial review, ex post parliamentary scrutiny, and monitoring by independent bodies such as audit institutions and human rights commissions (International IDEA, 2018; Dyzenhaus, 2006).

From the perspective of Indonesian constitutional law, these elements can be integrated without abandoning the existing constitutional architecture. The provisions of the 1945 Constitution on emergency powers would remain the ultimate source of legitimacy, while a specific statute on economic

emergencies or a revision of existing emergency legislation could articulate the detailed parameters, procedures, and oversight mechanisms discussed above (Asshiddiqie, 2007). Such a statutory framework would clarify when and how presidential powers may be exercised in response to economic crises, thereby enhancing legal certainty and accountability while preserving the necessary flexibility for effective crisis management. It would also respond to the critiques in the literature that Indonesia's current emergency framework is overly general and insufficiently attuned to the particularities of economic emergencies (Dyzenhaus, 2006; Ferejohn & Pasquino, 2004).

In conclusion, the discussion suggests that Indonesia's existing regulation and practice of presidential powers in emergencies provide a functional but incomplete basis for managing economic crises. By adopting a more precise and comprehensive legal construction of economic emergency powers—one that defines economic emergency, sets clear temporal and material limits, and strengthens oversight—the Indonesian legal system can better reconcile the need for decisive presidential action with the enduring demands of the rule of law and constitutionalism (Dyzenhaus, 2006; Agamben, 2005; Ferejohn & Pasquino, 2004).

CONCLUSION

The analysis of Indonesia's constitutional and statutory framework reveals that presidential emergency powers are formally grounded in the 1945 Constitution and Government Regulation in Lieu of Law Number 23 of 1959, yet remain general and predominantly oriented toward security-driven emergencies rather than economic crises. Economic crises have in practice prompted the use of extraordinary fiscal and financial measures by the executive, but these have not been accompanied by a clearly articulated legal construct of an "economic emergency" with defined parameters, procedures, and limits. This configuration generates normative gaps that may undermine legal certainty and increase the risk of executive overreach, particularly given the broad discretion currently enjoyed by the President under general emergency clauses.

Drawing on contemporary theories of emergency constitutionalism, particularly the works of Dyzenhaus, Agamben, and Ferejohn & Pasquino, the study suggests that Indonesia requires a more precise legal regime governing presidential powers in economic emergencies. An ideal construction would legally define economic emergency through objective indicators of severe economic disruption; establish a transparent procedure for declaration with meaningful legislative involvement; impose strict temporal and material limits on extraordinary powers; and institutionalise robust oversight by courts, parliament, and independent bodies. Such a framework would not only enhance legal certainty and accountability in the exercise of presidential emergency powers in the economic domain, but also ensure that even in times of acute economic crisis, the state remains firmly bound by the rule of law and its constitutional commitments.

REFERENCES

Agamben, G. (2005). *State of exception*. University of Chicago Press.academia

Asshiddiqie, J. (2007). *Hukum tata negara darurat* (Ed. 1, Cet. 1). Gramedia Pustaka Umum.

Dyzenhaus, D. (2006). *The constitution of law: Legality in a time of emergency*. Cambridge University Press.

Ferejohn, J., & Pasquino, P. (2004). The law of the exception: A typology of emergency powers. *International Journal of Constitutional Law, 2*(2), 210–239.

International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance. (2018). *Emergency powers* (Constitution-Building Primer, No. 19). International IDEA.

Peraturan Pemerintah Pengganti Undang-Undang Republik Indonesia Nomor 23 Tahun 1959 tentang Keadaan Bahaya. (1959). *Lembaran Negara Republik Indonesia*.

Respublica. (2021). Undang-undang pada masa pandemi Covid-19 dalam perspektif hukum tata negara darurat. *Respublica: Jurnal Hukum*

Qistina. (2024). Eksistensi kewenangan Presiden dalam penetapan keadaan darurat: Kajian perspektif hukum tata negara. *Qistina: Jurnal*

Justitia. (2020). Urgensi revisi Peraturan Pemerintah Pengganti Undang-Undang Nomor 23 Tahun 1959 tentang Keadaan Bahaya. *Justitia: Jurnal Hukum*

Undang-Undang Dasar Negara Republik Indonesia Tahun 1945.